Abstract: Various writers point out that accepting the terms of a contract does not imply consent to the background conditions of this contract. This is an important critical insight allowing for a critical perspective on the principle of free contract, according to which the state should not interfere with what adult agents contractually agree upon. In this paper I argue that the practical relevance of this critical insight depends on the availability of answers to three questions: (1) Which are the core features of baseline background conditions supporting a well-ordered labor market enhancing economic welfare? (2) In which cases and for which reasons are non-market institutions needed in order to support these features? (3) Under which conditions and at which levels can collective mechanisms be expected to support adequate non-market institutions`curing market failure' ? Some of the core properties of labor markets and labor contracts are discussed which need to be taken into account in attempts to answer these questions, most notably problems of contract enforcement, market failure and collective action.
Introduction and Outline
Our main conclusions [...] are that a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justied; that any more extensive state will violate persons' rights. (Robert Nozick 1974, ix) Early reasoning concerning justice in contractual labor relations has two concerns. The rst concern addresses the situation-specic micro-circumstances determining the extent of involuntariness of choice in contractual labor relations.
Scholastic thought tried to cope with suchlike problems using the Aristotelian idea of mixed will: for instance, Francisco de Vitoria (14921546) discusses the case of a master ceasing to pay recompense to his servant, putting the latter before the choice to stay and work for a zero wage or to leave. Here is Vitoria's reasoning concerning this case: I say that it would not have been simply voluntary but would have had something involuntary mixed with it, because he was powerless to do more, seeing that he was about to die of hunger and had nowhere else to go.
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Second, there is a (complementary and related)`systemic' issue at stake in normative reasoning regarding the labor market. More or less explicitly, it is also an underlying concern behind much of the more popular normative discussion on labor and wages: how to prevent the market system and market-mediated labor relations in particular from developing parasitic (or exploitative) relations with respect to extra-economic (or extra-market) spheres of social life essential for the reproduction of society? Such systemic parasitism may be a problem for the system at large and a cause of crisis: sub-subsistence wages and/or degenerative labor market conditions (conditions incompatible with requirements of reproduction, education and civilization in the long run 3 ) may obtain a systematic role for the working of the economy. Put another way, the structural conditions of market-mediated labor may be at odds with the sustainability of the economic system because their impact on spheres beyond the market tends to re back in the long run. Suchlike problems even worried Adam Smith (1776, I.viii; V.i), both in his reproduction-oriented theory of wages and in his critical reections on the drawbacks of the modern division of labor.
Be that as it may, the doctrine taught by Vitoria and others in the rst half of the 16 th century is subject to considerable vicissitudes until this day.
A few decades after Vitoria, the mainstream of the late-scholastic Salamanca ' (Langholm 1346; Weber 1959, 13642) .
In this paper, I will sketch the circumstances in which PFC may be defensible even in the context of labor relations. But I will stress that these circumstances are based on rather extreme assumptions, far away from observable trends in socio-economic development. The complexities of contract-mediated production tend to produce institutions and patterns with an unavoidably public character.
In particular, problems of collective action and incomplete contracts render the paradigms of pure private exchange insucient for discussing relevant baseline 2 Quote and translation by Langholm 1998, 134. 3 An inuential example of the articulation of such concerns is to be found in the view of labor and family in catholic traditions: rst, they conceptualize labor as bonum arduum which must be prevented from becoming pure toil and burden. Second, the idea of a family wage addresses the problem of conditions of reproduction in the extra-market sphere.
the individuals choose, of the contract. Suppose that we nd that some type of contractual terms is accepted by some individual, or by some class of individuals.
This fact does not reveal any information about the degree of consent to the rules of the game, i.e. to the conditions shaping the environment of pre-contractual bargaining as well as of post-contractual contract enforcement, nor does it reveal any information about the overall eciency of its outcome. As Scanlon (1988, 186) puts it, the background conditions under which choices are made in a laissez-faire system are`arbitrary from a moral point of view' [...]. All we know is that they will be conditions which arose from voluntary transactions, and this does nothing to ensure that they will be good conditions under which to choose. This is an important critical insight: it is a pivotal element of a theoretical architecture which allows for a critical perspective on PFC. I believe that questions related to issues analogous to (1)(3) should be asked in a systematic way in the case of labor contracts. Here are these questions:
(1) Which are the core features of baseline conditions supporting a well-ordered labor market enhancing economic welfare? (2)`Market failure': In which cases and for which reasons are non-market institutions needed in order to support these features? (3) Under which conditions and at which levels can collective mechanisms be expected to support adequate non-market institutions`curing market failure' ? For certain purposes, one might also be interested in a specic version of (3), namely (3'): Under which conditions will specic political forms of collective choice generate meaningful consent to background conditions? Pa-raphrasing Scanlon (1988, 186) , we could ask whether (and to which extent) participation in political mechanisms does something to ensure that they will be good conditions under which to choose.
In the remainder of this section, I will discuss some of the general problems which have to be dealt with when answering these questions. For the sake of simplicity, think of (1) if we try to keep these restrictions to a minimum, possibly not going far beyond those suggested by Nozick (1974) in the introductory quote. Along these lines, PFC has been particularly inuential in discussions concerning the regulation and the institutional environment of labor markets in the past decades. In the following, I show that minimizing regulations does not guarantee that we are on 6 For, the mind having in most cases, [...] a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not using of it right comes all the variety of mistakes, errors and faults [...] . the safe side. This discussion is essential for a constructive critique of PFC which avoids pouring out the baby with the bathwater, i.e., which takes on board one of the most powerful ideas of economic liberalism expressed by PFC: the potential of market-mediated exchange for a ne-tuning of social processes according to individual proles of needs, preferences, creativity and informationin other words: to give people`choice' and to prevent over-regulation suocating freedom, innovation, and the productive dynamism of diversity and specialization.
Here is a brief sketch of two types of arguments justifying the scope of political regulations interfering with PFC. The rst argument is related to circumstances triggering collective action. Suppose rst that the status-quo is inextricably intertwined with co-ordination failures (such as a prisoners' dilemma) which can be dealt with at a collective level only. In this case, my actual market choices reveal close to nothing in terms of information concerning my beliefs and preferences with respect to the norms and institutions required for the solution of such problems. If collective action is needed, PFC degenerates into a tool blocking discussions of ecient reforms which would be required in order to eliminate coordination failures closely intertwined with the status-quo. One can also look at this kind of problems from the opposite perspective: Suppose that some legislation constraining contractual labor arrangements has been enacted, such as rights to join a trade union, rights to parental leave, restrictions regarding the exposure to certain kinds of hazards, or child-labor, or working-time regulations.
In many suchlike cases it will be possible to show that this legislation violates PFC, i.e. prevents particular contracts which would make both parties better-o.
One can now ask: Is this sucient for advocating abolition of this legislation? As is an important determinant of labor opportunity costs, but in the rst place for the individual and her family (and perhaps the society at large in terms of long-run sustainability). Contract partners are not likely to care directly about such non-market related opportunity costs. Enforcement conditions of labor contracts may severely restrain workers with respect to their factual opportunities for responding to the demands of their family life or their own health, rendering market-choices non-revealing with respect to their true preferences. This is not a marginal problem since it relates to the core of modern production: modern production tends to require restrictions of individual time sovereignty (`labor discipline'). In the light of the above arguments, it is more than plausible that the eective scope of these restrictions should be an issue of public choice. It should not depend on the vicissitudes of relative scarcities and market power, but rather on the outcome of collective decisions. Merely ruling out slavery may not be enough. As the person-related scope of tradability of labor power increases (with tradability of the individual`as a whole' on slave markets as a border case), the person-specic opportunity costs that are conditional on value created in non-market spheres tend to disappear from any locus of decision.
In this section, I have given a very rough sketch of the issues which must be considered when looking at the background conditions of labor markets. All things considered, it suggests that a standard derived from an analysis of individual transactions (such as the absence of force and fraud), while disregarding problems of collective action and enforcement, may be insucient for a morally sound denition of labor market background conditions. Instead of elaborating on this sketch, I will now discuss various scenarios of background conditions for labor markets. Two of these scenarios are clearly unrealistic, one is unattractive, and the remaining two scenarios may provide the co-ordinates of problemoriented discussions on acceptable background conditions. In the context of these scenarios, some characteristics of contract-mediated co-operative production processes will come to the fore. These characteristics concern the core of market-mediated labor and must be considered when talking about desirable properties of labor market institutions (which is why I kept the pertinent passages brief and illustrative in the present section). Moreover, they are the basis of a deeper discussion of the labor-specic scope, relevance, and status of various market failure arguments, suggesting that a few simple constraints set once and for all will not solve the problems. obliged to point out that they consciously abstract from realistic features of rms, emphasizing that in these models it plays no role whether capital hires labor or labor hires capital. These abstractions may make sense for modeling the behavior of big interdependent market systems, but they are o the mark when considering the circumstances of labor contracts in order to deepen the understanding of existing or desirable constraints upon PFC. Hence let us have a closer look at the properties of labor which render the above-sketched models unrealistic.
The Ambiguity of Labor
Late scholastic authors discussed the problem of`hidden wage': suppose that a master clearly violates fairness rules (e.g. the wage is too low). Can we give conditions rendering unobserved self-compensation by workers (`shirking') legitimate? The scholastics diered in their assessments, but this is not the point here. The point is that very early on in the history of economic thought notions capturing some of the distinct features of labor markets (as opposed to other markets) played a role; notions which again came to the fore quite recently in labor market theories such as eciency wage theory. Which special features of labor and of labor markets give rise to those problems? In a moment, we will answer this question with a summary of the arguments by means of which the claim that`labor is dierent' can be supported. But we should rst take notice of the similarities to other markets, i.e. aspects which are the economic basis of tradability of labor. First, the traded services have the character of scarce private inputs. Time and eort spent in a particular labor process can't be spent somewhere else. In addition, it is possible to exclude third parties (which didn't contract with me) from the use of my labor services. Second, the output produced by rms is traded and priced on markets for private goods. Therefore the market valuation of produced output can be taken (in conjunction with marginal productivity) as the basis for imputing values to the contributing factors. Third, the quality of labor can be meaningfully modeled as the result of an investment decision concerning human capital. These aspects underscore the view that labor power is a private resource which must be made or kept tradable if eciency and liberty are to be preserved and enhanced. If tradability of an asset is inhibited or severely restricted, the value of market alternatives is no longer a basis for deciding on ecient use.
Even if all this applies, the above-sketched labor market model hinges on an additional assumption, presupposing that labor eciency units can be traded without problems. Under this assumption, wages can be regarded as relative prices expressing scarcity like the price of other commodities. In reality, wages must be seen under further aspects. First, wages are the main source of subsistence and well-being for large parts of the population. Second, labor, sometimes even participation in a particular labor process, may constitute an important part of personal identity. Third, let us now come to the specic dierences of labor contracts. They are inherently incomplete in the sense that it is impossible or too costly to foresee and specify all contingent duties they implicitly may be intended to entail. Moral hazard is endemic in labor markets: after contract conditions have been xed, it is in the interest of the worker to provide as little eort as possible. The employer is interested in extracting as much productivity as possible. If she has an opportunity to shirk without risk, the worker has a clear incentive to do so. If the employer need not be concerned about negative reputation eects or other sanctions, she has an incentive to expose workers to toxic chemicals whenever it is protable to do so.
Moral hazard occurs also on many other markets, most notably credit and insurance markets. But labor is not only no resource of known homogenous quality, but it also cannot be easily bought and sold in arbitrarily divisible quantities.
Typically the nature of the service provided makes it necessary that the laborer is physically present at the workplace as an agent for extended periods of time.
Often it will be ecient (because of hiring and training costs) that she spends a considerable span of her lifetime at a particular workplace or in a particular rm. This inter alia may cause further asymmetries, such as asymmetric costs of termination of labor contracts. Last but not least, labor conditions often will have a rst-order impact on spheres like politics or the family. This may be an important reason for public concern in its own. Moreover, duties related to these other spheres may exacerbate problems of moral hazard as they may provide quasi-moral justications of hidden action. Lack of family-friendly regulations of labor relations may provoke`justied shirking' (a phone-call to the kindergarten during work-time) in a way reminiscent of late-scholastic discussions on the hidden wage. Altogether, the following general presumption is justied: what is actually traded in labor markets is better referred to as`labor power', not as well-dened eciency units of labor.
The Firm as a Web of Contracts in the Night-watchman State
From the perspective of political philosophy, the problem with the incompleteness of labor contracts is that it reintroduces elements of the state of nature. and assume for a moment that giving authority to one side (`the capitalist rm') is ruled out, maybe because it is seen as a violation of self-ownership rights.
Under such circumstances a lot of haggling about contract fulllment will occur.
As discussed above, things on the labor market are by no means settled when the parties have agreed on the hours to work and on a particular wage. The rm is not a place where (passive) resources are pooled. It is a production process where agents continuously decide to deliver eort, take risks and so forth. Parties will be under the continuous temptation to shirk. Unfortunately enough, they have a lot of opportunities to do so. Workers' laziness may lead to inadequate maintenance and destruction of valuable capital equipment or to huge output losses in interwoven production processes. Investment decisions may reduce the value of workers' human capital. Work may be hazardous in a way unknown to the worker. Courts won't be of much use as an instance of arbitration because in absence of labor legislation they lack standards to decide whether`enough' eort has been delivered or whether imposing sanctions for`shirking' is`justied'.
It is not hard to see the underlying reason why the courts of a night-watchman state will hardly be well equipped to deal with competing claims in the sphere of labor contracts. The reason is that the rules of a night-watchman state are designed to protect private property domains as exclusive action space of individuals. Labor processes require a temporal, but often nearly complete suspension of privacy. They regularly require that the private sphere of the people involved is invaded in many ways. Workers are typically required to work together and thereby entertain social relationships with others. They are required to take extraordinary eorts and to do very unpleasant things at certain times.
Labor contracts may require persons to dress in a special way, to use or not use make-ups and perfumes, to engage in extremely hazardous activities (like extinguishing burning oil-elds) and so on. For reasons that are rarely endorsed today but were widely endorsed in the heyday of economic liberalism, they may even include requirements regarding family status (remember the marriage bars for female employees). The more robust of the privacy-invading requirements of labor discipline are driven by the technical conditions of interwoven production processes. Important aspects of working conditions (not only the speed of the assembly line) are`jointly consumed'. The eort a worker takes in these processes does aect the output of her co-workers. All this sets the stage for collectively binding decisions and some devices to enforce these decisions.
The Capitalist Firm in the Night-watchman State
The above considerations suggest that the web-of-contract rm in the nightwatchman state is irrelevant as a baseline scenario because of its lack of institutional remedies against contract incompleteness. Let us now drop the assumption that one-sided authority is ruled out, but keep the assumption of the night-watchman state. This means that we move to the capitalist rm, as conceptualized by Marx and others. This rm does in fact amount to a Leviathan solution to the above described problem of labor contract incompleteness by giving to one side the authority to determine what the other side has to do if an unforeseen contingency occurs. As in our earlier story, courts lack suitable principles for assessing (il)legitimate coercion. The coercive power of the Leviathanrm is of course restricted by competition on the labor market. Adam Smith (1776, I.x.c.61) believed that in the progressive state of society (going along with a growing economy) competition will impose suciently tight constraints, provided that some equity in labor market practices is establishedmainly ruling out coalitions of employers and other privileges which tend to undermine competition in an unfair, one-sided way. But in a stationary or declining state, labor supply tends to be overabundant so that Leviathan is hardly tempered.
Demand-and-supply conditions on the labor market would determine whether basic rights of workers as persons are respected, and whether labor conditions reect basic preferences or needs of employees. Put another way, these labor market governance institutions render the scope of self-ownership rights contingent upon the vicissitudes of relative scarcity and market power. The consequence of all this is a bundle of public regulations, distributive policies and provisions eected by collective bargaining which jointly modify the charac-ter of hierarchical capitalist rms. This bundle is quite well-suited to protect employees from excessive dirt, excessive heat, excessive health hazards, and so forth. Moreover, it gives rise to various policies (whose suitability in the face of new challenges is hotly contested these days) with the goal of reconciling the demands of market-mediated production with reproduction in families.
It has been subject to two main kinds of criticism. First, it infringes upon contract freedom by imposing constraints at highly centralized levels. It may well be that the web of constraints imposed by state legislation and collective bargaining on a macro-level does not exploit all existing opportunities for ne-tuning, as its mechanisms for accommodating vast ranges of dierent preferences, different abilities, dierent dispositions, and dierent tasks are naturally limited.
Second, adherents of emphatic concepts of democracy also resent the paternalistic aspects of centralized and unavoidably bureaucratized schemes of regulation:
they do not always enhance the collective autonomy of agents in local contexts of particular labor processes. The hierarchical character of the rm is only modied in that constraints on permissible procedures are superimposed, but it is not altogether altered. Nonetheless, one can imagine technical conditions which, in conjunction with workers' preferences and socio-cultural conditions, lead to the conclusion that a suitably amended model of democratic capitalism is the best we can hope for. But there is a respectable tradition of a dierent model emphasizing the potential of democracy at the decentralized level of rms 9 , including employee ownership and control of rms otherwise operating in competitive markets. Some pros and cons referring to this model will be sketched in the following.
Conditions for Economic Democracy
To put the following in perspective, an introductory remark is in order. Centralized and more decentralized levels of collective decision making could be seen as complimentary, raising the question of an optimal institutional mix providing answers to collective action problems of dierent scale and scope. Some matters need to be dealt with at more centralized levels, most notably the constitutional option for economic democracy itself. Many supporters of economic democracy are keenly aware of this. An intelligent model of economic democracy would reect this and would avoid excessive decentralization.
But for sake of clarication of the issues and values involved, it makes sense to discuss laboristic economic democracy as a distinct model. Both democratic capitalism as well as economic democracy are paying tribute to the fact that, for good economic and extra-economic reasons, most people do not want their livelihoods to be governed totally by atomistic competition. Industrial democracy is the regime which presumably would take into account the agency-related faculties of workers in a more direct and activity-enhancing way. It may be in a better position to accommodate concerns raised by communitarians and by adherents of more emphatic`participatory' conceptions of democracy. By giving agents a say with regard to collectively binding decisions at the rm level, which concern 9 For a summary of motivating ideas, see Dahl 1985. matters that most importantly aect them on the particular decentralized level as a community of producers, it could enhance diversity and experimentation. It could also enhance and broaden entrepreneurial agency and mitigate tendencies of excessive bureaucracy, excessive uniformity and rm size`too big to fail'. But what about tradability of labor? It seems that tradability would be restricted and channeled in a very specic way which is not straightforwardly attractive. Incumbent workers of successful rms might tend to form stable groups and would be reluctant to admit newcomers as members with full rights to vote and residual claims. One might end up with a system where stable cooperatives trade on output markets, with an extremely restricted market for labor and, put cautiously, a very specic capital market. To be sure, there is one institutional arrangement which could cope with these problems: making membership rights of cooperative rms tradable (Fehr 1993) . Tradable membership rights would enable members to leave rms without giving up their share of expected residual income streams to which they have contributed. They could sell membership rights at a price equal to the capitalized value of that income stream. This arrangement is not without peculiarities. It seems to combine aspects of market-mediated labor mobility with aspects of to-days market for corporate control. Moreover, buying a membership right will be a risky transaction, with few direct possibilities of diversication. Markets for such rights may be thin and thus not competitive, which, in turn, would make it necessary to establish an institution that solves the bargaining problems occurring in the negotiations about the proper price.
These problems notwithstanding, economic democracy is interesting as a candidate for a baseline scenario. It seems to provide an institutional alternative to democratic capitalism accommodating a plausible balance of markets and collective choice mechanisms, given the characteristic problems of the production sphere. This model becomes more interesting, the more relevant the shortcomings of existing models of democratic capitalism turn out to be. One may speculate (cf. Sturn 1994) that the advantages of economic democracy are related to the importance, the distribution, and the degree of specialization of human capital, along with the technological possibilities of external control of labor processes and the nature of co-operation-related interdependencies at the workplace. Even if one comes to the conclusion that a full-edged model of economic democracy has too many drawbacks for putting it on the agenda for institutional reform, it should be taken seriously as a source for critical reection of relevant baseline conditions for the exchange of labor.
By contrast, an arrangement combining private ownership and markets (cf., e.g., Nozick 1974, 187) with the minimal state has exhausted its potential in terms of sharpening our thinking on baseline background conditions of labor markets. According to Nozick, the framework for a libertarian ideal includes the minimal state as an ideal protective arrangement. Now in a`rst-best' world without any of the frictions which are known to challenge the paradigm of mutually benecial exchange, it may be dicult to justify the minimal state and (public enforcement of ) private property rights and contract enforcement. In such a world, PFC and the Coase theorem must be expected to hold in an allencompassing sense (cf. e.g. Sturn 1997, III.2). People could achieve any real improvement by means of spontaneous negotiations: a Golden Age anarchy. The
Nozickian argument in favor of the minimal state and against any other form of state presupposes a very specic prole of public coordination problems, i.e., a second-best world; Nozick's`ideal' is meaningful if and only if these problems exactly coincide with the interdependencies justifying provision of public goods by the minimal stateand in particular do not include the above-sketched complexities of labor markets. In absence of this unlikely coincidence, legitimate collective institutions are characterized by a web of public norms and regulations which is more complex, more subtle and less static than is implicit in the vision of a state`limited to narrow functions'.
10 More specically, given that the production-related agency problems are empirically mediated by the institution of the capitalist rm with asymmetric authority, adherents of individualist rights in a broadly Lockean tradition can hardly recommendeverything else remaining equala move from welfare capitalism towards a minimal state as an attractive political reform. Even though a move towards a minimal state enhances contract freedom, it is likely to make things worse in terms of non-justied privacy-infringing tendencies at the workplace. Given a capitalist organization of production, the minimal state fails to be second best because the amount of illegitimate coercion must be expected to increase. The incidence of such coercion is diagnosed on the basis of reasonable baseline conditions of exchange which include workable solutions of the problems regarding labor market governance.
These problems are assumed away in Nozick's scenario thus triggering the minimization of constraints upon PFC. Notice though that I do not argue that the underlying contractual reasoning is not amenable to powerful insights and much less that it is nonsense. Quite to the contrary, PFC is a powerful heuristic elucidating pitfalls of over-regulation, including the case of labor markets. The crucial mistake (not only by philosophical libertarians such as Nozick, but also by more wide-spread and more pragmatic everyday libertarianism) is to treat PFC as a presumption assumed to be valid either in general, or (in a more pragmatic version) valid unless conclusive empirical evidence concerning the detrimental eects (e.g. of some types of labor contracts) becomes available. This implies a problematic and unwarranted asymmetry in the onus of argument and empirical support. What I called`the ambiguity of labor' leads to the suggestion that PFC is dramatically misleading as a general presumption in the case of labor relations.
Concluding Remark
Nozick believes that a libertarian regime is best suited to promote respect for persons who may not be used in certain ways by others as means [...] or resources, as he paraphrases a Kantian concern (Nozick 1974, 333) . Indeed, market-mediated employment of labor is not necessarily accompanied by treating laborers as mere means. But contrary to Nozick's paraphrase of the Kantian concern, totally ruling out an instrumental dimension of individual contributions 10 Cf. Child 1994 for discussions of related problems.
in modern production processes altogether amounts to unrealistic romanticism, given their essentially interwoven and open-ended nature: part of my agency will typically become a means of production in processes which I do not control. A more reasonable position is to address this concern by embedding labor contracts in institutional settings in which agency-related powers of workers as humans become eective, while acknowledging the unavoidably instrumental aspect of the use of human resources in co-operative production processes on the basis of produced means of production. In a way, Nozick asks for the wrong thing to start with (unconditional non-instrumentalism), and eventually ends up with an approach that oers no sucient resources to cope with characteristic problems of labor markets, problems which cannot be solved by making private (self-)ownership rights more rigid but only by engaging market participants in collective decision mechanisms and public regulations. Ironically, the libertarian approach lacks the resources to diagnose cases of merely instrumental treatment of human labor partly because the inescapably instrumental aspect of labor in co-operative production is under-conceptualized.
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